I support this proposal and I think itâs important to be honest about why compensation is justified. The losses in the Keyring vault (as well as others) werenât just caused by Stream/Elixir collapsing. They were made far worse by failures inside Euler itself.
Euler had a direct integration with Elixir, and the vaults relied on that integration for liquidation purposes. When Elixir decided to turn it off, that integration didnât work and the liquidation option was effectively broken at the exact moment users needed it. Thatâs not an external issue, thatâs a failure inside Eulerâs system.
These vaults also were âverifiedâ, which clearly signals that the vaults have been vetted. Yet those vaults had hidden exposure to Stream (via Elixir) that users couldnât see or reasonably infer. I should know firsthand, when I first saw rumblings about Stream being insolvent, I went through and made sure I removed ALL my exposure to it by exiting a bunch of capital pools. However this hidden Elixir-Stream deal left me exposed, and to be clear that was NOT even something I was lending against when I initially entered the Keyring vault. It got added days before this crisis without any warning or notice to me, directly changing the risk profile of the vault without informing pre-existing depositors.
Meanwhile, deposits into all of these Euler vaults stayed open long after the insolvencies were public knowledge. Other protocols (like Compound & Silo) froze markets immediately, reduced collateral factors, set limits on borrows, raised interest rates, and performed liquidations to protect their depositors. Euler didnât do any of that. There were no warnings, the UI looked normal, and APRs barely even climbed on some vaults, with more users able to deposit into vaults that were already compromised due to the Stream/Elixir contagion.
There is a deeper architectural flaw here. If a curator or market manager can add or expose a vault to new collateral or dependencies without any visible signal to users, thatâs a serious attack vector. Users simply cannot protect themselves when these changes happen behind the scenes.
Finally, the risk curator model did not function as the docs describe. Curators are supposed to manage collateral selection, supply caps, and concentration risk. Yet users ended up effectively tied to a single failing dependency and took enormous haircuts as a result. No reasonable risk framework should allow one collateral source to wipe out half (or more, TBD) of a depositorâs position.
All of this shows that the losses were not purely the result of external protocols failing. They were heavily shaped by issues within Euler- failed integrations, misleading trust signals, poor collateral concentration, and a lack of timely frontend warnings/alerts. Because of that, compensation here is not a goodwill gesture. Itâs a recognition that Eulerâs own systems did not perform as users needed them to.
I strongly support putting compensation options to a DAO vote and will be voting yes with all of my EUL tokens.
TL;DR
This wasnât just Elixir or Stream failing. Eulerâs Elixir integration broke, verified vaults had hidden exposure, concentration risk wasnât controlled, warnings came too late, and deposits stayed open while the system was already compromised. Users relied on Eulerâs signals and those signals failed. Compensation is warranted and should go to a vote.