RFC: Delegate Optimisations in Governance: 2 - Recognised Delegates

View on the current format

We favor compensating those members who add value to the ecosystem, especially as it outlines a pathway for community members to get more involved in the DAO. Even with the active delegate proposal, it can be difficult for those who want to delegate to filter through all the candidates. Still, in combination with a recognized delegate program, it can create a workflow for “rising delegates” to get more publicity.

However, voting members based on candidates selected by the core team could lead to centralization issues. This would not be a permissionless system and would make it harder for new members to become recognized delegates. Voters are often quite apathetic when voting people into power; recognized delegates will likely have large voting power and will be more easily able to keep themselves in power.

Additionally, this incentivizes people to simply be likable and not voice dissenting opinions out of fear that they will be removed from their position, not because they weren’t doing good work but because they didn’t agree with those in power.

Moving Forward

We believe the recognized delegates should be a permissionless program role where anyone is able to become a recognized delegate and receive compensation if they follow the outlined path and adhere to responsibilities.

Recognized delegates will differ from active delegates in the following ways:

Recognized Delegates Active Delegate
Opt-in System Does not have to Opt-in
Eligible for compensation Ineligible for compensation
Minimum Voting Participation - 80% Minimum Voting Participation - 60%
Communicate with the community Only provide rationale on Snapshot

Example:

Using the MakerDAO model.

Delegate A: Has over 600 EUL, votes on 100% of proposals, and is highly communicative then they are compensated at the full 200 EUL.

Delegate B: Less than 600 EUL have a voting turnout between 99% and 80% or are only somewhat active in communicating their votes, and their compensation is decreased according to a decided formula.

This way, everything is trustless, and the positions cannot be centralized or gate-kept.

Final thoughts

We are very excited about this proposal as we believe it will encourage more community members to be active participants and help Euler DAO mature and grow. However, we think it is important to implement this safely and permissionless to prevent centralization in the Euler.

By Matt & Bobby @ StableLab