lot of great feedback and points made here!
To clarify because it was brought up specifically - the intent behind this RFC was discussion around safety module specifically and the value it’d create to users, and thus EUL by extension. Matters of EUL liquidity or ‘general utility’ like AMM LP’ing I think may be implied here or can be related, but main focus of this post was intended to be about creating value for users via a safety feature of product / protocol and in aligning EUL with that value creation directly …
@maxholloway @jengajojo @Millie @Shippooor - many thanks for detailed thoughts and feedback here -
For sure agree that it’s possible EUL would be correlated with other assets /markets that are being subjected to the bad debt scenario - not necessarily always the case however. That said, can definitely see how stables alleviate potential risk here of EUL correlation.
The flip side of stables however (I think @Millie mentioned this) is there really isn’t any fully immutable / uncensorable stables (exception LUSD, others?) - for example USDC, and thus DAI, FRAX, USDT and others are all pauseable. Imo, protocol is best off minimizing censorship introduced directly into insurance /safety module, which is (potentially) providing a very fundamental form of protocol collateral. Perhaps it’s possible to even eliminate this risk altogether…
So, I think ETH and/or EUL token itself become the more natural candidates here for using in a safety module, given censorship resistance. And I do think EUL is the more ‘aligned’ asset to be using w/r/t protocol itself.
So re correlation concerns - which seem very valid - I wonder if a safety module could be designed to alleviate these concerns in a way where price is more stable. Something like…
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Some target amount of coverage against protocol deposits would be established.
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EUL is staked in the safety module to play key role in said coverage.
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Module effectively acts as a market mechanism between protocol treasury/revenue and stEUL where DAO treasury is buying covered puts from module itself with strike price of ~ 20% discount to 30d TWAP. Maybe chainlink oracle or something similar could provide simple reliable pricing for premium…
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Staked EUL is yielding as result….
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Puts would be executed by protocol only in time of ‘bad debt’ - proceeds of which are used to cover debt.
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This way regardless of whether or not EUL is correlated with market events that may have created bad debt, the DAO benefits from being able to source decent liquidity without slippage and maximize coverage, and stakers still benefit from solid sale price.
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The entire time, users of Euler’s current or future products know their usage is covered against more extraneous events than they are today.
^^ This is rly just an example design attempting to address concern of correlation- would be curious what folks here think abt this sort of approach and different / better ways it could be designed.
Regarding points on time lock, voting incentives etc - overall I think there’s a lot of value in systems that align / reward longer term owners / pov. Governance powers etc…
I also think the best case for a system like this where it’s made as autonomous as possible. Governance minimized. Maybe using ve-style timelocks does help to alleviate concern of stakers "backing out” ….
Overall, my POV is that whatever way this were to be built / implemented, stakers should not be able to withdrawal as soon as some event takes place - they should be required to hold up their end of bargain as a function of smart contract-level enforcement.
Idea here is not for free lunch for EUL, rather enable it to express risk appetite and both reward it for taking on risk and enforce it in actually eating that risk when called upon.
To conclude…
As it stands rn, Euler the protocol inherits and manages these risks - natural to a money market protocol like this. But there’s no specific plan for actually dealing with this risks should they materialize…
I do think a safety module benefits the protocol and it’s users - in providing explicit protection against bad events, and allowing protocol itself to explicitly express and transfer that risk to a specific subset of the protocol (EUL token) where it’s deemed most efficient.
I think it’d be awesome to see community come up with design for this which addresses concerns around :
- Overall execution design and enforcement
- censorship
- liquidity,
- correlations
- Anything else(?)